College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2014

Section 6: Criminal
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 6: Criminal" (2014). Supreme Court Preview. 242.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/242

Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview

VI. Criminal
In This Section:
New Case: 13-604 Heien v. North Carolina

p. 465

Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 465

“U.S. SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS WHETHER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ALLOWS REASONABLE MISTAKES OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW”
Sherry F. Colb

p. 474

“CAN A POLICE OFFICER LAWFULLY PULL OVER A CAR FOR A TRAFFIC
VIOLATION BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRAFFIC
LAWS?”
Orin Kerr

p. 481

New Case: 13-7451 Yates v. United States

p. 484

Synopsis and Questions Presented

p. 484

“TOP U.S. COURT TO HEAR WHITE-COLLAR CASE OF FISH THROWN
OVERBOARD”
Lawrence Hurley

p. 489

“FISHY APPLICATION OF SARBANES-OXLEY’S BAN ON EVIDENCE
DESTRUCTION”
William Peacock

p. 491

“FISH NOT TANGIBLES UNDER SOX, DEFENSE GROUPS TELL JUSTICES”
Carolina Bolado

p. 493

“COMMERCIAL FISHERMAN’S CONVICTION FOR DISPOSING OF HIS CATCH OF
UNDERSIZED GROUPER UPHELD”
The Swartz Law Firm

p. 495

New Topic: Death Penalty Protocols

p. 497

“COURT EXTENDS CURBS ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN A FLORIDA RULING”
Adam Liptak

p. 497

“ARIZONA EXECUTION WILL MOVE FORWARD AFTER LAST-MINUTE APPEALS”
Josh Sanburn

p. 500

“ARIZONA KILLER TAKES TWO HOURS TO DIE, FUELING LETHAL INJECTION
DEBATE”
Matt Pearce, Cindy Carcamo, & Maya Srikrishnan

p. 502

“ONE EXECUTION BOTCHED, OKLAHOMA DELAYS THE NEXT”
Erik Eckholm

p. 505

“GAMBLING WITH DEATH: IS THE SUPREME COURT POISED TO ABOLISH THE
DEATH PENALTY?”
Evan Mandery

p. 509

“CAN THE DEATH PENALTY SURVIVE LETHAL INJECTION?”
Tierney Sneed

p. 512

Heien v. North Carolina
13-604
Ruling Below: State of North Carolina v. Nicholas Brad Heien, 749 S.E.2d 278 (Mem) (N.C.
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 1872 (2014).
Defendant was convicted, on his guilty plea, in the Superior Court, Surry County, of attempted
trafficking in cocaine by transporting and by possession. He appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed. State was granted petition for discretionary review. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Nicholas Brady HEIEN.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Decided on April 2, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Nicholas Brady Heien (“defendant”) pled
guilty to attempted trafficking in cocaine by
transportation and possession in Surry
County Superior Court in May 2010,
preserving his right to seek review of the
denial of his motion to suppress. The trial
judge found defendant's prior record level to
be Level I and sentenced defendant to ten to
twelve months on each count with the
sentence on the second count to be served
consecutively to the first. Defendant
appealed to this Court (“Heien I ”). That
appeal resulted in our Court reversing
defendant's conviction. In that case, this
Court held that the traffic stop which led to
defendant's arrest was not based on
reasonable suspicion. The State successfully
sought discretionary review of our decision.

Our Supreme Court reversed and remanded
to this Court so that the remaining issues
raised by defendant could be addressed. This
appeal
addresses
defendant's
other
challenges to the search which resulted in
his conviction.
The events which led to defendant's arrest
and conviction originated with a traffic stop
initiated by Sergeant M.M. Darisse, an
officer with the Surry County Sheriff's
Department. The facts regarding this stop
are more fully set forth in our initial opinion
concerning defendant's case (Heien I ) and
our Supreme Court's opinion which
reversed Heien I. The facts will not be
repeated in this opinion except to the extent
necessary to support this Court's rationale.
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In this Court's initial decision concerning
defendant's appeal, we reversed defendant's
conviction on the basis of the officer's stop,
which the lower court found to be valid.
There the trial court stated, “[Sergeant]
Darisse had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the ... vehicle and the driver
were violating the laws of this State by
operating a motor vehicle without a properly
functioning brake light.” In Heien I, this
Court found, after an extensive statutory
analysis, that the statute dealing with brake
lights as opposed to taillights, only required
a vehicle to have one functioning brake
light, and thus the officer's belief that
defendant's vehicle must have two
functioning brake lights was erroneous. That
statute reads:
(g) No person shall sell or operate on
the highways of the State any motor
vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven
cycle, manufactured after December 31,
1955, unless it shall be equipped with
a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle.
The stop lamp shall display a red or
amber light visible from a distance of
not less than 100 feet to the rear in
normal sunlight, and shall be actuated
upon application of the service (foot)
brake. The stop lamp may be
incorporated into a unit with one or
more other rear lamps.
The State appealed and our Supreme Court
ruled that the officer's traffic stop was
objectively reasonable. At the Supreme
Court, the State accepted this Court's
statutory interpretation in Heien I. Our
Supreme Court stated:
After considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that there
was reasonable, articulable suspicion to

conduct the traffic stop of the Escort in
this case. We are not persuaded that,
because Sergeant Darisse was mistaken
about the requirements of our motor
vehicle laws, the traffic stop was
necessarily unconstitutional. After all,
reasonable
suspicion
is
a
“commonsense,
nontechnical
conception[ ] ... on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act,” and the Court of Appeals analyzed
our General Statutes at length before
reaching its conclusion that the officer's
interpretation of the relevant motor
vehicle laws was erroneous. After
considering the totality of the
circumstances, we hold that Sergeant
Darisse's mistake of law was
objectively reasonable and that he had
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
in which defendant was a passenger.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and remand this
case to that court for additional
proceedings.
The case has now been remanded to this
Court to address defendant's remaining
challenge to the events leading up to his
arrest. In defendant's Motion To Suppress,
defendant argues:
10. No traffic charges were filed, and
only a warning ticket was written. The
continuation of the investigation after
the motor vehicle stopped, including the
questioning of the Defendant, was not
based on a reasonable articulable
suspicion that criminal activity had been
committed or was being committed.
11. The time that lapsed after Officer
Darisse learned from the Department of
Motor Vehicles computer that as to Mr.
[V]asquez, “... everything was valid on
the license and registration ...” and
wrote the warning ticket, constituted an
466

unreasonably prolonged traffic stop and
Defendant was unlawfully detained and
his car unlawfully searched.

inside the duffle bag and elsewhere
inside the vehicle should be suppressed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

12. Under the totality of the
circumstances the officers had no just
cause to detain the Defendant, question
him, or search his vehicle without a
warrant.

In reviewing a trial court's order concerning
a motion to suppress, this Court utilizes the
following test:

13. The questioning and other
investigation of the Defendant, the
prolonged stop, and the search and
seizure of Defendant and his property
were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution as the same is made
applicable to the states, and are in
violation
of Article
I,
Sections
19 and 20 of the Constitution of the
State of North Carolina.

Generally, an appellate court's review of
a trial court's order on a motion to
suppress “is strictly limited to a
determination of whether its findings
are supported by competent evidence,
and in turn, whether the findings
support the trial court's ultimate
conclusion.” Where, however, the trial
court's findings of fact are not
challenged on appeal, they are deemed
to be supported by competent evidence
and are binding on appeal.

I. SCOPE OF THE VEHICLE SEARCH
14. The alleged controlled substance
was found inside a sandwich bag which
was inside a paper towel which was
inside a white grocery bag which was
inside the side compartment of a duffle
bag which was inside the vehicle.
Neither Officer Darisse nor Officer
Ward advised the Defendant that they
were going to search his car for
narcotics before he gave verbal consent.
The Defendant was entitled to know the
object of their search prior to giving
consent. Had he known, he would have
had the opportunity to place explicit
limitations on the search. The failure of
the officers to explain the object of the
search violates Defendant's right to be
free from unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment to the [United]
States Constitution and Articles 19 and
20 of the Constitution of North
Carolina, and evidence of items found

I. Length of Stop
Defendant argues that the traffic stop was
unduly prolonged in his motion. Our
analysis begins with the pertinent trial
court's findings of fact:
8) Darisse upon instigating his blue
lights, observed a head “pop up” out of
the back seat of the subject vehicle and
then disappear.
9) Darisse upon approaching the vehicle
observed the defendant lying in the
back seat of the vehicle.
10) Darisse observed the defendant
lying in the back seat underneath a
blanket. Darisse informed the driver of
the vehicle that he was being stopped
for a non-functioning brake light and
asked the driver to step out to the rear of
the vehicle. The driver complied.
Darisse engaged in a brief conversation
with the driver asking the driver if
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anything was wrong with the person in
the back seat, from where the driver
began travelling and his ultimate
destination. The Driver informed
Darisse that the defendant was tired and
the pair were going to West Virginia.
The driver was informed that the officer
intended to issue him a warning citation
so long as long documentation provided
to Darisse was valid. Darisse took the
driver's license and registration then
returned to his vehicle. Darisse formed
the opinion that the driver appeared
nervous to him as he made poor eye
contact and he was continuously placing
his hair in a ponytail and then removing
his hair from a ponytail. Defendant
continued to lie in the back of the
vehicle and did so through the entire
stop until he was later approached by
Darisse.
11) Officer Ward arrived at the scene of
the stop. Ward was informed by Darisse
that a subject was lying in the back of
the vehicle underneath a blanket. Ward
went to the vehicle and asked defendant
for his driver's license in order to
determine his identity and check for
outstanding warrants. The defendant
complied and gave his driver's license
to Ward without getting up from his
position.
12) The driver continued to stand
between Darisse's patrol car and the
subject car as Ward asked for the
defendant's driver's license.
13) The interaction between Ward and
the
defendant
occurred
in
approximately one to two minutes.
14) The stop of the subject vehicle was
initiated at approximately 7:55:40 a.m.
15) Darisse re-approached the driver
and returned his driver's license and any

other identifying documents he had
received and gave the driver a warning
citation. Darisse then asked the driver if
he would be willing to answer some
questions. The driver indicated by
nodding his head that he had no
objection to answering questions and
stated he would answer questions.
Darisse's tone and manner with the
driver of the vehicle was polite, nonconfrontational and conversational.
16) The driver denied any type of
contraband in the car.
17) The driver denied guns or large
sums of cash in the car.
18) This conversation occurred within a
period of a minute to two minutes.
19) Darisse then asked for permission to
search the vehicle. The driver did not
object to searching the vehicle, but
informed Darisse that the vehicle was
the defendant's, and Darisse should
make
the
request
of
the
defendant. Darisse approached the
defendant who was still lying in the
back of the vehicle and asked for
permission to search the vehicle. The
defendant informed Darisse that he had
no objection to the vehicle being
searched, although the officers might
have a problem because the inside of
the vehicle was messy.
20) The tone and manner of Darisse
when asking for permission to search
the vehicle with the defendant was
conversational, non-confrontational and
polite.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 20
of the North Carolina Constitution guarantee
the right of people to be secure in their
person and property, and free from
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unreasonable searches. A traffic stop is
permitted if an officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that there is criminal
activity afoot or when a motorist commits a
violation in his or her presence. In this case
our Supreme Court has established that the
traffic stop was permissible. The temporary
detention of a motorist during a valid traffic
stop is recognized as a seizure, but a
permissible one, as it is considered
reasonable. While it is recognized that the
motorist is seized for constitutional
purposes, roadside questioning during the
encounter does not trigger the need
for Miranda warnings. Once the purpose of
the stop has been addressed, there must be
grounds which provide a reasonable and
articulable suspicion in order to justify
further delay. Generally, the return of the
driver's license or other documents to those
who have been detained indicates the
investigatory detention has ended. The fact
that the documents have been returned does
not mean that the officer loses all right to
communicate with the motorist. Thus, noncoercive conversation is still permitted. An
officer may ask questions or request consent
to search so long as the individual freely and
voluntarily consents to answer questions or
to allow his or her property to be searched.
So long as an individual is aware that he is
free to leave or free to refuse to answer
questions, there is no bright-line rule
requiring police to refrain from requesting
consent to speak to an individual or request
consent to search his or her person or
property.

reasonable person would believe he was free
to leave or refuse the request. The trial court
found the encounter became consensual. The
testimony and exhibits at the suppression
hearing tend to support the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law; thus,
we are required to uphold its determination
that the defendant freely consented to the
search as a reasonable person in his position
would not feel coerced under similar
circumstances.

Here, the return of documentation would
render the encounter between defendant and
the officers consensual so long as a

Based on this record we believe the trial
court was entitled to conclude that defendant
was aware that the purpose of the initial stop

Here the encounter was not unduly
prolonged. The trial court found that the
traffic stop was initiated at 7:55:40 a.m. and
that defendant gave his consent to search at
8:08 a.m. During that time the two officers,
Ward and Darisse, had discussed the
malfunctioning brake light with the driver,
had discovered that the two claimed to be
going to different destinations (West
Virginia or Kentucky), and had observed
that defendant engaged in rather bizarre
behavior by lying down on the backseat
under a blanket, even when approached by
Officer Ward who requested his driver's
license. After each person's name was
checked for warrants, their licenses were
returned. Defendant had his license back
before the request to search was made. The
trial court found that the officer's tone and
manner were conversational and nonconfrontational. Both defendant and the
driver were unrestrained during this
encounter, no guns were drawn and neither
individual was searched before the request
to search the vehicle was made.
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had been concluded and that further
conversation was consensual. The dissent
maintains that there is insufficient evidence
in the record to sustain this conclusion, but
there is no requirement that a defendant be
explicitly informed of his right to refuse a
request to search.
The dissent seems to argue that this
defendant was merely a passenger and, as
such, would not feel free to leave or deny
consent since the record does not establish
that defendant knew the driver Vasquez had
received his license and a warning ticket had
been issued. This argument ignores the fact
that defendant was not a mere passenger, but
was the owner. It is uncontroverted that
defendant's driver's license had been
returned to him prior to the consent to search
request. We believe that the trial court's
conclusion that defendant consented to this
search is reasonable and should be upheld,
as we further believe a reasonable motorist
or vehicle owner would understand that with
the return of his license or other documents,
the purpose of the initial stop had been
accomplished and he was free to leave, was
free to refuse to discuss matters further, and
was free to refuse to allow a search.
II. Scope of Search
In his motion to suppress, defendant also
asserts that the officer should have informed
defendant that he was searching for
narcotics so that defendant could have
issued some limiting instructions. We find
this argument unpersuasive. Just as there is
no requirement for an officer to explicitly
inform defendant of his right to refuse a
search, there is no requirement that an
officer inform defendant of what he is

searching for. We believe that any
reasonable person would understand the
officer was searching for weapons, cash or
contraband. The driver, Vasquez, was asked
if any of those items were in the car.
Additionally, defendant informed Darisse
that it might be difficult to search the vehicle
as it was messy. We also believe both the
driver and defendant were aware that the
search would be somewhat detailed as the
driver was asked to identify any objects that
did not belong to him. Sergeant Darisse
evidently began to search the vehicle and
immediately found a bag of marijuana under
the front seat and marijuana seeds in the
ashtray. At this point, the officers had
probable cause to search the entire vehicle
as well as probable cause to arrest both the
driver and defendant. The fact that
defendant may have wished to limit the
search became irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
In the case at bar, defendant's automobile
which was being driven by another
individual, was properly stopped by officers
of the Surry County Sheriff's Department
while on routine traffic patrol. After the
officer had issued a warning ticket for a
nonfunctioning brake light and both persons
had their driver's licenses returned, a request
to search the vehicle was made. We
conclude that on the record before the trial
court there was ample evidence that a
reasonable person would understand he was
free to leave or refuse to consent to the
request. The trial court concluded defendant
consented to the search and the trial court's
conclusion is supported by the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing. Shortly
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after the search was initiated, probable cause
to conduct a more detailed search and to
arrest the occupants was obtained. We thus
will uphold the trial court's conclusion that
this was a consensual encounter and affirm
its denial of defendant's Motion To
Suppress.
Affirmed.
Judge ERVIN concurs.
Judge McGEE dissents with a separate
opinion.
McGEE, Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's
conclusion
that
Defendant
“freely
consented” to the search of his vehicle, since
that conclusion is contrary to binding
precedent of our Court in State v. Jackson.
“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided the same issue, albeit in a different
case, a subsequent panel of the same court is
bound by that precedent, unless it has been
overturned by a higher court.”
A crucial fact, found by the trial court, is
that Defendant remained lying on the back
seat inside his vehicle while officers
questioned the driver, who stood outside
Defendant's vehicle between an officer's
patrol car and Defendant's vehicle. A crucial
fact, not found by the trial court, is that
Defendant knew the traffic stop was over
when he consented to the search.
“When a police officer makes a traffic stop,
the driver of the car is seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.... [A]
passenger is seized as well and so may
challenge the constitutionality of the stop.”

“Once the original purpose of the stop has
been addressed, in order to justify further
delay, there must be grounds which provide
the detaining officer with additional
reasonable and articulable suspicion or the
encounter must have become consensual.”
First, we determine at what point the
original purpose of the stop had been
addressed by the officers. In Jackson, the
officer stopped the vehicle on suspicion the
driver was operating the vehicle without a
license. This Court concluded the detention
was limited to “confirming or dispelling [the
officer's] suspicion that [the driver] was
operating his vehicle without a license.” The
officer,
however,
continued
the
interrogation.
Such interrogation was indeed an
extension of the detention beyond the
scope of the original traffic stop as the
interrogation was not necessary to
confirm or dispel [the officer's]
suspicion that [the driver] was operating
without a valid driver's license and it
occurred after [the officer's] suspicion
that [the driver] was operating without a
license had already been dispelled.
In this case, the original purpose of the stop
was the brake light. The detention was
limited to confirming or dispelling the
suspicion that the brake light did not
function. However, after the citation, an
officer asked Defendant for consent to
search. The request for Defendant's consent
was not necessary to confirm or dispel
suspicions regarding the brake light. The
request to search extended the detention
beyond the scope of the original traffic stop.
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Second, we decide whether the delay was
justified by determining if (1) the encounter
between Defendant and the officers became
consensual or (2) there were grounds for a
reasonable and articulable suspicion. The
trial court concluded “the encounter between
the officers, [D]efendant and the driver,
became a consensual encounter at the time
the driver voluntarily agreed to answer
questions, after the warning citation was
delivered to the driver and both driver and
[D]efendant had all documents returned.”
“The test for determining whether a seizure
has occurred is whether under the totality of
the circumstances a reasonable person
would feel that he was not free to decline the
officers' request or otherwise terminate the
encounter.” “[T]he return of documentation
would render a subsequent encounter
consensual only if a reasonable person under
the circumstances would believe he was free
to leave or disregard the officer's request for
information.” The person at issue is this case
is Defendant, not the driver. The trial court
and the majority conflate the perspectives of
the driver and Defendant, resulting in the
use of an erroneous standard.
“[A] passenger in a car that has been
stopped by a law enforcement officer is still
seized when the stop is extended.” “A
passenger would not feel any freer to leave
when the stop is lawfully or unlawfully
extended, especially ... where the officer was
questioning the driver away from the vehicle
while the passengers waited in the vehicle.”
No findings show or suggest Defendant was
aware that an officer had issued a citation or
that the officers had completed the
investigation of the brake lights. In fact, the

trial court found that Defendant remained in
the back seat, inside the vehicle. A
reasonable person under the same
circumstances would not believe he was free
to leave because, from Defendant's
perspective inside the vehicle, the stop
continued while the driver was questioned
outside. Without a finding that Defendant
was privy to the same information as the
driver, this Court does not impute the
driver's knowledge to Defendant.
Because Defendant consented during an
unlawful seizure of his person, the consent
was ineffective to justify the search.
The majority also considers the length of the
delay, without holding it to be de
minimis. To the extent the majority
considers the delay's length, I must dissent
because the issue is not preserved. Although
the State argues on appeal that (1) the delay
was de minimis and (2) reasonable
articulable suspicion existed to justify the
delay, the State did not make such
arguments at trial, and the trial court made
no ruling on either issue.
An appellee may list proposed issues on
appeal “based on any action or omission of
the trial court that was properly preserved
for appellate review and that deprived the
appellee of an alternative basis in law for
supporting the judgment, order, or other
determination from which appeal has been
taken.” “In order to preserve an issue for
appellate review, a party must have
presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion, stating the specific
grounds for the ruling the party desired the
court to make if the specific grounds were
not apparent from the context.” These
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alternative bases are not preserved for our
review.
The majority analyzes a second issue, scope
of the search, which Defendant did not argue

to this Court. Because this issue regarding
the scope of the search is not before us, I
dissent from the majority as to its conclusion
on that issue as well.
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“U.S. Supreme Court Considers Whether the Fourth Amendment Allows
Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law”
Verdict
Sherry F. Colb
April 30, 2014
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Heien v. North
Carolina. Heien raises the issue of whether a
stop is lawful, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, when the basis for the stop is the
officer’s having seen the driver do
something lawful that the officer reasonably
but mistakenly believes violates state law.
Described differently, the question is
whether the Fourth Amendment protects
against stops by a police officer who acts on
the basis of a reasonable but erroneous
interpretation of state law. Different courts
of appeals have arrived at distinct
conclusions on this issue, so the Court will
be resolving a circuit split in answering what
turns out to be a difficult Fourth
Amendment question.
Facts of Heien
In Heien, a police officer pulled over a
vehicle in which the right rear brake light
initially failed to illuminate when the driver
engaged the brakes. The officer interpreted
the existing traffic law to prohibit driving a
car with one non-functioning brake light.
The state court of appeals later determined,
however, that the traffic law actually
requires only one working brake light and
that the officer who stopped the car
therefore had no valid reason for the stop.
This interpretation conflicted with what

others had reasonably understood to be the
meaning of the statute.
Had the driver of Nicholas Brady Heien’s
car been charged with a traffic violation, the
case would have been dismissed, under the
court of appeals’ interpretation of the
statute. One cannot, after all, be guilty of
violating a legal requirement that does not
exist. After pulling over the driver, however,
the officer in the case asked for and received
consent from both driver and passenger
(Heien) to search the vehicle, and the
subsequent search turned up cocaine. Heien
was then arrested and charged with
trafficking in cocaine, on the basis of the
evidence found during the search of the
vehicle.
Given the state court of appeals’
interpretation of the statute, the defendant
argued that the evidence at issue should
have been suppressed as the fruit of an
unlawful stop. What made the stop
unlawful? The fact that it happened without
any reasonable suspicion that something
unlawful had occurred or was about to
occur, the standard for validating a brief
stop, under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Terry v. Ohio.
The Meaning of “Reasonable Seizures”
Under the Fourth Amendment
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The Fourth Amendment protects people’s
right to be secure against “unreasonable . . .
seizures.” Among other things, this gives
people a right to liberty from detention by
the government (i.e., liberty from “seizures
of the person”) absent a valid basis for their
detention. For police to lawfully conduct a
brief stop of a suspect, the Supreme Court
has held that they must have a “reasonable
suspicion” that unlawful activity is in
progress or has been committed.
Reasonable suspicion is a less rigorous
standard than what is needed for an arrest,
which generally requires “probable cause”
to believe that a crime has taken place.
While more lenient than probable cause,
however, “reasonable suspicion” still
demands that police have some factual basis
for suspecting a violation of the law before
detaining an otherwise free person, even for
a short time.
Within this legal framework, a police officer
might stop a driver who is weaving from
side to side in traffic. In this situation, police
could reasonably suspect that the driver is
intoxicated, and driving while intoxicated is
against the law. It could turn out that the
driver is not intoxicated but was weaving
because she is a relatively new driver.
Still, the stop would be legally valid, and if
the police saw narcotics in plain view during
the stop, those drugs would accordingly be
admissible against the driver in a subsequent
drug-related criminal prosecution. Police, in
other words, can be mistaken in their
suspicions without thereby violating the
Fourth Amendment requirement that they
act “reasonably.”

In Heien’s case, the problem is that what the
police reasonably suspected (driving with a
broken brake light) turned out to be lawful
activity, under the state court of appeals’
interpretation of the law at issue. To
“reasonably suspect” lawful activity does
not ordinarily justify a seizure, so the police
in this case might have violated the Fourth
Amendment. If so, then the evidence that
turned up during a consent search on the
heels of the stop might represent “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” inadmissible against Heien
in his prosecution for cocaine trafficking.
An Easy Case
Consider what an easy case of police error
would look like. Assume that the law
permits people to play music while they
drive. A police officer is driving on the
highway and hears the sounds of radio
music (The Grateful Dead) emerging from a
car driven by John Doe. The officer now has
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that the
driver is playing music in his vehicle while
driving. Absent some other objectively
reasonable basis for pulling over John Doe,
however, the police officer in this situation
may not stop Mr. Doe without violating the
Fourth Amendment. This is true, moreover,
even if the officer happens to believe
(without a good reason) that it is illegal to
play music while driving.
Take a different scenario. Now the officer
believes that John Doe is committing an
actual offense, such as driving while
intoxicated, but the officer lacks any
adequate factual grounds for that belief.
Perhaps the officer again hears Grateful
Dead music coming out of the car. The
officer (unreasonably) concludes that
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listening to the Grateful Dead provides
strong evidence of intoxication. If the officer
pulls over Mr. Doe on the basis of this
conclusion,
then—absent
some
independently valid basis for the stop—she
will be violating the Fourth Amendment.
For a stop to comply with the Fourth
Amendment, then, requires both that the
facts support a conclusion that the person to
be stopped is doing or has done some act
(X) and that X be illegal. But what happens
when X is legal and the officer reasonably
(though incorrectly) believes that X is
illegal? That is the question presented by
this case.
In an important sense, the two hypothetical
scenarios above, in both of which the officer
lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, are essentially the same. Having
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that a
driver is doing something legal is the same
thing as having “no reasonable suspicion” to
believe that the driver is doing something
illegal. In these two scenarios, hearing
Grateful Dead music coming from the
vehicle plays both roles—it is good evidence
that the driver is listening to music while
driving (which is legal), and it is inadequate
evidence that the driver is driving while
intoxicated (which is illegal). Any time
police lack reasonable suspicion to justify a
stop, it will always be the case that they
simultaneously (1) have a factual basis for
believing that the driver is doing something
lawful (e.g., driving at the speed limit), and
(2) lack a factual basis for believing that the
driver is doing something unlawful.
Reasonable but Mistaken Factual Beliefs

Fourth Amendment doctrine has always and
necessarily tolerated errors by police
officers. Police, like other humans, are
imperfect and therefore will sometimes
carry out valid searches or seizures that turn
up nothing, particularly given the relatively
permissive standards of “probable cause”
and “reasonable suspicion” that authorize
searches and seizures.
Police might, for example, have probable
cause to believe that Jane Roe robbed a bank
and that she is hiding the fruits of that crime
in her knapsack. (Say an eyewitness to the
robbery identified Jane in error.) In such a
case, police will be able to obtain a warrant
to arrest Jane in her home and to seize and
search Jane’s knapsack for the proceeds of
the robbery.
The fact that Jane is actually innocent of the
robbery does not in any way negate the
“reasonableness” of what the police do. The
Fourth Amendment does not require that
police be factually correct in their suspicions
every time they carry out a search or seizure.
It requires only that police always behave
reasonably when they carry out searches or
seizures.
In what contexts are errors acceptable?
Generally, “reasonable” police errors have
concerned the facts. As in the description
above, police may have gathered sufficient
evidence
(through
witnesses
or
observations) to warrant the conclusion that
a particular person committed a crime and/or
that evidence of crime may be found in a
particular location. If so, and if police obtain
a warrant (in those cases in which a warrant
is required), then they have complied with
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, even
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if it turns out that they were mistaken about
the facts and that the suspect at issue is
innocent and/or the location in question does
not contain the predicted evidence.
Reasonable Legal Errors
On the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
approach, police who briefly stop a suspect
comply with the Fourth Amendment so long
as they reasonably—even if mistakenly—
believe that what they witnessed evidences
the suspect’s having violated an actual law.
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law,
however, the reasonable errors that the
Court finds to have complied with the
Fourth Amendment have typically been
errors of fact and not of law. In this sense,
the officer who “reasonably believes” that
driving with music on is illegal is in
uncharted territory, as is the officer who
erroneously but reasonably believes that
driving with only one working brake light is
illegal.
One could argue, as the North Carolina
Supreme Court maintains, that being
reasonably mistaken about the law is really
no different from being reasonably mistaken
about the facts. When police believe, with
good reason, that the law has been violated,
then they may act—whether their mistake
turns out to be one of law or one of fact. As
we saw above, for example, an officer who
stops someone playing music in his car
because the officer believes that playing
music is illegal is making the same sort of
mistake as the officer who stops someone
playing music in his car because the officer
believes that playing (Grateful Dead) music
evidences intoxication.

To support this position, the North Carolina
Supreme Court cites a U.S. Supreme Court
case that approves an arrest for violating an
ordinance that was subsequently declared
unconstitutional. In Michigan v. DeFillippo,
police arrested a man for violating an
ordinance, and the (otherwise lawful) search
incident to arrest that followed turned up
evidence of a drug offense, for which the
man was charged. On appeal, the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the ordinance
that the man had violated was
unconstitutionally vague. Nonetheless, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the arrest was
valid, because it was made on the basis of
“good faith” reliance on a presumptively
valid statute. This case might seem
effectively to dispose of Heien, since the
officer
in Heien,
like
the
police
in DeFillippo, reasonably relied on what
turned out to have been an incorrect but
reasonable reading of the law.
Good Faith
The problem with this equation of factual
and legal errors is that ever since 1984,
when police have made reasonable legal
errors rather than reasonable factual errors,
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on the
admission of resulting evidence on the basis
of the “good faith” exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule rather than
finding actual compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.
Because DeFillippo was
decided before the good faith doctrine was
born, its applicability to the scenario in
Heien might be supplanted by the more
recent, more properly applicable good faith
doctrine. The reasoning in DeFillippo,
moreover, may be harmonized with that
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underlying the good faith doctrine. After all,
although the Court in DeFillippo relied on
the Fourth Amendment itself rather than on
a good faith exception to exclusion, it
expressly used the phrase “good faith,”
which could help link that decision with the
later-developed good faith doctrine.
The “Good Faith” Exception to Exclusion
In many situations, police “reasonably” act
in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
which the Court confusingly calls “good
faith,” though it refers to objectively
reasonable reliance rather than to
subjectively good intentions (the ordinary
meaning of “good faith”). In such situations,
the Court has recognized an exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and
accordingly permits the admission of any
resulting evidence at the suspect’s
subsequent criminal trial, even though there
might have been a Fourth Amendment
violation.
The Court first announced the “good faith”
exception to exclusion in United States v.
Leon. The Court held that if it is reasonable
to rely on what turns out later to have been a
defective warrant, then police reliance on
that warrant, though in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, will nonetheless yield
admissible evidence. This can occur if
police have assembled factual evidence that
they “reasonably” believe satisfies the legal
probable cause standard, though the
evidence they have assembled actually falls
short of that standard, according to a later
reviewing court. In this circumstance, the
fact that there is a reasonable basis for
believing in the validity of the warrant,
coupled with police diligence in having

sought a warrant and thereby observed the
protective safeguard entailed in consulting a
neutral magistrate, sufficiently redeems their
conduct to permit the introduction of any
resulting evidence.
A “good faith” error in this sort of case is
best characterized as an error of law: though
police have reason to think that what they
have observed and gathered is sufficient to
satisfy the legal standard of “probable
cause,” it actually is not. Yet the evidence
comes in.
A few years later, in Illinois v. Krull, the
Court extended the “good faith” exception to
cover cases in which police carry out a
search or seizure pursuant to the authority of
a statute that, a court later determines,
violates
the
Fourth
Amendment. Krull means that if a police
officer “reasonably” searches or seizes on
the basis of a statute that turns out to have
authorized unconstitutional searches or
seizures, the evidence that an officer finds as
a result of the constitutional violation is
nonetheless admissible in evidence at the
suspect’s subsequent criminal trial. As
in Leon, the sort of officer error at issue
in Krull is best characterized as a legal error,
because it stems from an erroneous
understanding of what the U.S. Constitution
has to say about a statute that authorizes
searches or seizures. Yet the evidence comes
in, despite a Fourth Amendment violation.
In Arizona v. Evans in 1995 and Herring v.
United States in 2009, the Supreme Court
held that if police carry out an arrest based
on a warrant in whose existence they
reasonably but mistakenly believe, then
evidence found as a result of the arrest is
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also admissible under the “good faith”
exception to the exclusionary rule. These
cases involved computer databases that
contained erroneous information indicating
that there were warrants outstanding for the
arrests of the respective suspects. As in the
other good faith cases discussed here, the
best account of these cases is that they
involved errors of law. The police were in
error about the existence of legal
authorization from a magistrate for a seizure
of the person (an arrest), but the evidence
was admissible anyway.
Most recently, the Court held, in Davis v.
United States, that an unconstitutional
search of a vehicle incident to arrest, if
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance
on binding appellate precedent holding that
the Fourth Amendment authorizes such
searches, does not trigger application of the
exclusionary rule. In the case in question,
there was binding appellate precedent
holding that the Fourth Amendment always
permits the search of a vehicle, incident to
an arrest of an occupant of the vehicle, even
after the arrestee has been secured and
cannot reach the vehicle. This turned out to
be erroneous, under a U.S. Supreme Court
case, Arizona v. Gant, which came down
after the search took place but before
Davis’s
conviction
became
final.
Nonetheless, it was “reasonable” for police,
at the time of the search, to rely on binding
appellate precedent going the other way.
In Heien, as in Davis, a police officer made
a decision to carry out a search or seizure on
the basis of a reasonable assumption that the
law allowed it, but a later, unforeseeable
judicial decision ruled that the law in fact

rejected it. In Davis, the error concerned an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
itself, while in Heien, the error concerned an
interpretation of the substantive traffic law.
Yet in both cases, an officer acted on the
basis of an erroneous but reasonable
understanding of the governing law. It
seems accordingly likely that the Supreme
Court will see fit to apply its good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in this
case rather than holding that police comply
with the Fourth Amendment when they stop
someone for violating a law that does not
exist (but that the officer reasonably believes
does exist).
The Impact of Ruling on the Basis of
Good Faith
For purposes of deciding whether evidence
resulting from the stop in Heien was
admissible, it does not matter very much
whether the Supreme Court decides that the
search was reasonable (based on a
reasonable mistake of law) or that even if
the search was unreasonable, the error was
made in good faith (because one could have
reasonably interpreted the statute to prohibit
driving with one broken brake light). Either
way, the evidence comes in.
Nonetheless, the outcome I predict—that the
Court will find a good faith exception for
errors of law—will provide an opportunity
for the current Court to marginalize the
exclusionary rule again, as it has done many
times before. The Court will likely repeat its
views that (1) the Fourth Amendment does
not require exclusion and that (2) exclusion
of evidence is a costly measure that should
be pursued only as a matter of last resort.
When a police officer reasonably but
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erroneously interprets the traffic law to
prohibit what a driver is doing, then—
whether or not the officer violates the Fourth
Amendment in doing so—there is no good
reason to suppress reliable, probative
evidence where the police did nothing
deliberate, reckless, or even negligent, in
acting as they did.
Deciding the case in this fashion, as I expect
the Court will do, will have the benefit of
avoiding the possibility of narrowing the
scope of the Fourth Amendment itself.
Rather than saying expressly that a police
officer may lawfully stop someone for
committing a nonexistent traffic offense, the
Court would be limiting its discussion to the
question of remedy and leaving the
substantive issue open.

which no deterrent exists for Fourth
Amendment violations. Certainly no one
will be able to bring a lawsuit against a
police officer (or a department) for stopping
people who violate what the officer (or
department) “reasonably” believes is the
law. Thus without the exclusionary rule,
where there is any margin for error, there is
every incentive for police to “reasonably”
interpret the law to prohibit what they want
it to prohibit, rather than erring on the side
of caution. Ironically, then, the Court’s
continuing reliance on the “good faith”
doctrine to avoid explicitly addressing
Fourth Amendment questions might in
reality serve to narrow the scope of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections as
effectively as a decision to do so expressly
would have done.

On the other hand, deciding the case in this
fashion will also mean one more context in
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“Can a Police Officer Lawfully Pull Over a Car for a Traffic Violation Based
on an Erroneous Understanding of the Traffic Laws?”
The Volokh Conspiracy
Orin Kerr
December 21, 2012
Under Whren v. United States, the police
can pull over a car based on probable cause
to believe a traffic violation has occurred.
Any civil traffic violation counts: If you’re
driving at 36mph in a 35 mph zone, you can
be lawfully pulled over. But what if the
officer pulls over a car based on his belief
that a violation has occurred, and it turns out
that the officer has the law wrong? That is,
what if you’re not violating the law, and the
officer mistakenly thinks you are? And
here’s where it gets interesting: What if the
officer’s mistake about the law is a
reasonable one?
Lower courts are deeply divided on the
question, and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina just entered the fray with State v.
Heien, ruling by a vote of 4-3 that the Fourth
Amendment permits an officer to execute a
seizure based on a reasonable mistake of
law. The facts of Heien are the best possible
facts for the government in a case like this.
An officer spotted a car with a broken rear
right brake light. The officer pulled over the
car, and the traffic stop eventually led to the
discovery of drugs in the car. The defendant
was convicted, and on appeal persuaded the
North Carolina Court of Appeals to adopt a
rather surprising interpretation of the traffic
laws.
According to a long statutory analysis from
the North Carolina Court of Appeals,

interpreting several archaic sections of the
traffic code, it was actually legal to have one
broken brake light as long as the other brake
light functioned properly. The state
government saw the opportunity: It accepted
this interpretation of the statutes, and it
petitioned the North Carolina Supreme
Court only on the Fourth Amendment
question of whether the stop was
constitutionally reasonable even though it
turned out that the officer’s belief that a
broken tail light was unlawful was not
correct. That is, did pulling over the car with
a broken tail light violate the Fourth
Amendment?
A divided North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that the stop was constitutionally
reasonable. The officer had a reasonable
belief as to what the traffic laws meant, the
majority reasoned, and he acted reasonably.
Because the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonableness, this is all the Fourth
Amendment requires and the resulting stop
was constitutional. The dissent agrees that
the officer acted reasonably in a generic
sense, but it argues that we would not want
to systemically allow stops of people who
are not breaking the law at all based on
erroneous officer understandings of what the
law is. The dissent also points out that this is
like an exclusionary rule case in disguise:
The majority’s reasoning is akin to saying
that there is a good faith exception at the
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remedies stage, the kind of thinking that
should not infuse the court’s reasoning at the
initial stage of whether a constitutional
violation occurred.
This is a very interesting Fourth Amendment
issue — and not an easy one, at least to me.
At first blush, my sympathies tend to be
with the defense here. That’s true for three
reasons, which I’ll concede may be a bit
idiosyncratic. First, I’ve always thought that
the unstated rationale of why the courts
allow a traffic stop for a non-criminal
violation must be to enforce the traffic laws
— it’s a sort of regulatory rationale which
acts as an exception to the usual rule that
cause of criminality is required to make a
stop. Given that regulatory purpose, it seems
sensible that the scope of the police power is
based on what that law actually prohibits,
not what an officer mistakenly thinks it
prohibits. And it doesn’t help that the police
tend to have tremendous influence on their
state traffic laws: As a practical matter, if an
officer can’t find a traffic violation to stop a
car, he isn’t trying very hard. And if a court
identifies a problem with the traffic laws as
the lower court did here, the legislature is
likely to fix it in the government’s favor
pronto. Given that, I’m not sure why we
would need a doctrine that makes room for
officer errors of law.
Second, as a Criminal Law professor, I can’t
help but approach the question by reference
to the doctrine of mistake of law in criminal
law. When a citizen makes a reasonable
mistake of law as to what is criminal, the
general rule is that ignorance of the law is
no excuse. If a citizen reads the law and
perfectly reasonably thinks his conduct is

lawful, only to have a court take a surprising
reading of the criminal law and say he is
guilty, the courts say “enjoy your time in
prison, Mr. Marrero.” And they say that for
a good reason. Although it seems harsh in
rare cases where the law is construed in a
surprising way, we generally want citizens
to approach the law with care and have an
incentive to learn about it. Looking beyond
that one case, it’s very hard to administer
routine areas of the law if anyone has an out
based on their claim to have reasonably
misunderstood it. If we apply that rule to
citizens facing the awesome power of the
state, it seems only fair to apply the same
rule to the state facing its citizens.
Third, I agree with the Heien dissent that
this is basically a remedies question under
the guise of substantive Fourth Amendment
law. If the exclusionary rule is going to be
about officer culpability, then say that there
is a Fourth Amendment violation here and
no exclusionary remedy. But it doesn’t make
much sense to harness the same principle to
determine what is a Fourth Amendment
violation in the first place: If you’re going to
draw a sharp rights/remedies distinction,
then I think the rationale for the rights and
remedies should be kept separate.
With that said, if this case goes up to the
U.S. Supreme Court, I highly doubt a
majority of the Court would share my initial
instincts. If the U.S. Supreme Court takes
this case, they will probably see this as an
easy case for much of the same reason they
saw Davis v. United States as an easy case:
The officer acted reasonably based on the
law known at the time, so the government
should win. They might look at the legal
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question differently in a case with better
facts for the defense, but the facts here
would seem to make a government win
particularly likely.
And finally, there’s a cynical case to be
made that the ultimate outcome may not
make much of a difference in the setting of
traffic stops. As long as the Whren rule
survives that a traffic violation alone
justifies a stop, occasional ambiguities in the

traffic laws are not likely to interfere much
with traffic stops. If the officers can rely on
reasonable mistakes of law, then the courts
will allow the stops. And if the officers can’t
rely on them, the police can go to the
legislature and the legislature wil clarify the
ambiguities in their favor. Either way, the
police have the advantage in cases like this
over the long haul so long as Whren is in
place.
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Yates v. United States
13-7451
Ruling Below: United States of America v. John L. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), cert
granted, 134 S.Ct. 1935 (2014).
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida of
knowingly disposing of undersized fish in order to prevent government from taking lawful
custody and control of them, and destroying or concealing “tangible object with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence” government's investigation into harvesting undersized grouper.
Defendant's motion for acquittal was denied. Defendant appealed.
Question Presented: Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish
would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which makes it a crime for anyone who
“knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation,
where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns
accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or
informational content or purpose.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
John L. YATES, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on August 16, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
DUBINA, Circuit Judge.

I.

Appellant John L. Yates ("Yates") appeals
his convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §§
1519 and 2232(a), which arose out of his
harvesting undersized red grouper in federal
waters in the Gulf of Mexico. After
reviewing the record, reading the parties'
briefs, and having the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm Yates's convictions.

On August 17, 2007, Yates and his crew
prepared the Miss Katie, a fishing vessel, for
a fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf
of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, John Jones
("Officer Jones"), a field officer with the
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission, who was deputized by the
National
Marine
Fisheries
Service
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("Fisheries Service") to enforce federal
fisheries laws, was on an offshore patrol
with fellow officers when he encountered
the Miss Katie. Officer Jones noticed the
Miss Katie was actively engaged in a
commercial harvest using longline fishing
gear, so he approached and boarded the Miss
Katie to inspect for gear, fishery, and
boating-safety compliance.

directive. At Yates's prompting, the crew
then took other red grouper and placed them
in the wooden crates that had held the
undersized fish. After the switch was
completed, Yates instructed Lemons to tell
any law enforcement officers who asked that
the fish in the wooden crates were the same
fish that Officer Jones had determined were
undersized.

While on board, Officer Jones noticed three
red grouper that appeared to be less than 20
inches in length, the minimum size limit for
red grouper at that time. As a result, Officer
Jones decided to measure Yates's fish to
determine whether they were of legal size.
Officer Jones separated grouper that
appeared to be less than 20 inches so he
could measure them. He measured the fish
with their mouths closed and their tails
pinched. Officer Jones gave Yates the
benefit of the doubt on the fish that
measured close to 20 inches but separated
the fish that were clearly under the legal
limit and placed those fish in wooden crates.
In total, Officer Jones determined that 72
grouper clearly measured less than 20
inches. Officer Jones then placed the
wooden crates in the Miss Katie's fish box
and issued Yates a citation for the
undersized fish. Officer Jones instructed
Yates not to disturb the undersized fish and
informed Yates that the Fisheries Service
would seize the fish upon the Miss Katie's
return to port.

After the Miss Katie returned to port,
Fisheries Service special agent James
Kejonen ("Agent Kejonen") traveled to
Cortez, Florida to meet Yates and
investigate the report of undersized grouper.
On August 27, 2007, Officer Jones was
called in to remeasure the fish, which he did
in the same manner as before — mouths
closed and tails pinched. Sixty-nine fish
measured less than 20 inches. Officer Jones
noticed that, although some of Yates's
undersized red grouper had previously
measured as short as 18 to 19 inches, none
of the grouper unloaded at the dock were
that short. In fact, at sea, most of Yates's
grouper had measured between 19 and 19
1/2 inches, but at the dock, the majority of
the grouper measured close to 20 inches.
Due to Officer Jones's suspicion that the
undersized fish measured on August 27 were
not the same fish he had measured on
August 23, federal agents interviewed
Lemons, who eventually divulged the crew's
nefarious conduct.

Contrary to Officer Jones's directions, Yates
instructed his crew to throw the undersized
fish
overboard.
Thomas
Lemons
("Lemons"), one of the crewmembers,
testified that he complied with Yates's

At trial, Yates disputed whether the red
grouper thrown overboard were actually
undersized because Officer Jones had only
measured the fish with their mouths closed,
not open. In other words, Yates argued it
was possible that, had the fish been
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measured with their mouths open, they
would have measured legal size. The day
before trial, the district court held a Daubert
hearing to evaluate the qualifications of the
two grouper-measuring experts proffered by
the parties. The government offered Dr.
Richard Cody ("Dr. Cody"), a research
administrator with the Fish and Wildlife
Research Institute, as a potential expert
witness. Dr. Cody was prepared to testify
that, on average, a grouper measured three
to four millimeters longer when its mouth
was open versus when its mouth was closed.
Yates did not object to that contention, but
he did object to other portions of Dr. Cody's
testimony. The district court took Dr. Cody's
testimony under advisement but did not
decide whether he could testify as an expert
on measuring grouper. The district court
also ruled that Yates's expert, William Ward
("Mr. Ward"), research director for the Gulf
Fishermen's Association, could offer
testimony about a grouper's measurement
with an open mouth as opposed to a closed
mouth and about fish shrinkage when placed
on ice.
Ultimately, the government did not call Dr.
Cody as a witness in its case-in-chief. After
the government rested, Yates's counsel
announced for the first time that he planned
to call Dr. Cody as his first witness to testify
about the length of grouper with an open
mouth versus a closed mouth. The
government objected. The district court
sustained the government's objection, ruling
that Yates was precluded from calling Dr.
Cody in his case-in-chief because Yates had
failed to properly notify the government of
his intention to call Dr. Cody as an expert
witness, as required by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16. After the district
court had made its ruling, Yates called as his
first witness Mr. Ward, who testified that
fish can shrink on ice and that grouper
measure longer with their mouths open than
with their mouths closed. On crossexamination, the government questioned Mr.
Ward about his own state and federal fishing
violations.
At the conclusion of the government's casein-chief, and at the close of all the evidence,
Yates moved for judgment of acquittal on all
counts. The district court denied both
motions. After a four-day trial, the jury
found Yates guilty of (1) knowingly
disposing of undersized fish in order to
prevent the government from taking lawful
custody and control of them, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (Count I); and (2)
destroying or concealing a "tangible object
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence" the government's investigation
into harvesting undersized grouper, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count II).
The district court sentenced Yates to 30
days' imprisonment, followed by 36 months'
supervised release. Yates timely appealed
his convictions.
II.
Yates presents three issues on appeal. First,
Yates argues the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
on Counts I and II, because the government
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
the fish thrown overboard were undersized.
Second, Yates argues the district court erred
as a matter of law in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal on Count II, because
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the term "tangible object" as used in 18
U.S.C. § 1519 does not apply to fish.
Alternatively, Yates argues the statute is
ambiguous and the rule of lenity should
apply. Finally, Yates argues the district court
abused its discretion by precluding him from
calling Dr. Cody during his case-in-chief.
III.
"We review de novo a district court's denial
of a motion for judgment of acquittal on
sufficiency of evidence grounds." "In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we look at the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict and draw all
reasonable inferences and resolve all
questions of credibility in its favor." We
review questions of statutory interpretation
de novo.
IV.
A Sufficient evidence was presented at trial
for the jury to conclude the fish thrown
overboard were undersized.
Yates contends that Officer Jones's failure to
measure the fish with their mouths open —
as opposed to only measuring them with
their mouths closed — creates speculation as
to whether the fish would have measured
undersized with their mouths open. As such,
he argues there was not sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude the fish thrown
overboard were undersized. We disagree.
First, the testimonial evidence given by
Officer Jones, Agent Kejonen, and Mr.
Ward conflicts as to whether measuring a
fish with its mouth open, as opposed to
closed, makes a difference in the fish's
overall length. The jury was free to weigh

the conflicting evidence and decide whether
opening or closing a fish's mouth made a
large difference, a small difference, or no
difference at all in the fish's measurement.
Further, Officer Jones testified that while he
was on board the Miss Katie, Yates scolded
his crew for keeping undersized fish and
stated, "Look at this fish, it's only 19 inches.
How could you miss this one?" Similarly,
Agent Kejonen testified that, on the dock,
Yates admitted to having at least "a few"
undersized fish on his boat when Officer
Jones measured them days earlier.
Moreover, that Yates directed his crew to
throw the fish overboard creates an
inference that he — as an experienced
commercial fisherman — believed the fish
to be undersized. In sum, a "rational trier of
fact could have found . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the fish thrown into
the Gulf were shorter than the legal limit.
Accordingly, we conclude from the record
that sufficient evidence was presented at
trial for the jury to convict Yates of Counts I
and II.
B. A fish is a "tangible object" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Yates contends the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
as to Count II because the term "tangible
object" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 "only
applies to records, documents, or tangible
items that relate to recordkeeping" and "does
not apply to . . . fish."
"In statutory construction, the plain meaning
of the statute controls unless the language is
ambiguous or leads to absurd results."
"When the text of a statute is plain, . . . we
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need not concern ourselves with contrary
intent or purpose revealed by the legislative
history." Further, undefined words in a
statute — such as "tangible object" in this
instance — are given their ordinary or
natural meaning. In keeping with those
principles, we conclude "tangible object," as
§ 1519 uses that term, unambiguously
applies to fish. Because the statute is
unambiguous, we also conclude the rule of
lenity does not apply here.

Cody's corroboration of Mr. Ward's
testimony would have countered the
government's attempt to discredit Mr. Ward.

C. Yates's right to present a defense was
not prejudiced by the district court's riding
that disallowed Yates from calling Dr. Cody
during his case-in-chief.

It is unnecessary for us to determine whether
the district court properly exercised its
discretion in precluding Dr. Cody from
testifying at trial, because we conclude
Yates has failed to show the preclusion
prejudiced his right to present a defense. As
Yates conceded in his brief, his expert Mr.
Ward offered the same testimony Yates
hoped to elicit from Dr. Cody. Indeed, our
review of the record shows Dr. Cody's
testimony would have been less favorable to
Yates than that of Mr. Ward. Moreover,
under the circumstances presented here,
Yates's inability to offer Dr. Cody's
testimony to rehabilitate Dr. Ward's
credibility does not amount to prejudice of
his substantial rights.

Because Yates waited until the close of the
government's case-in-chief to disclose Dr.
Cody as an expert witness, the disclosure
was untimely under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(C). As a
sanction for this untimely disclosure, the
district court did not allow Dr. Cody to
testify during Yates's case-in-chief. Yates
does not dispute that he did not give proper
notice to the government pursuant to Rule
16(b)(1)(C). Instead, Yates argues that the
district court should have used a lesser
sanction to address his late disclosure, and
that the district court's outright preclusion of
Dr. Cody's testimony at trial infringed on
Yates's constitutional right to present a
defense. According to Yates, Dr. Cody
would have reinforced his expert Mr. Ward's
testimony that red grouper measure longer
with their mouths open than with their
mouths closed. Yates also contends Dr.

"Relief for violations of discovery rules lies
within the discretion of the trial court[.]"To
warrant reversal of the court's discretion on
appeal, "a defendant must show prejudice to
his substantial rights." While the right of the
accused to present a defense is a substantial
right, that right is not boundless.

V.
For the above stated reasons, we affirm
Yates's convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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“Top U.S. Court to Hear White-Collar Case of Fish Thrown Overboard”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
April 28, 2014
A fisherman prosecuted under a white-collar
crime law for disposing of fish while he was
under investigation has persuaded the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear his case.
The court said on Monday that it will hear
arguments over a jury's 2011 conviction of
Florida fisherman John Yates on two of
three charges, including one under the "antishredding" provision of the 2002 SarbanesOxley law.
The provision penalizes the destruction or
concealment of "a tangible object with the
intent to impede, obstruct or influence" a
government investigation and was intended
to prevent fraud of the sort committed by
companies such as Enron Corp and
WorldCom Inc.
Yates's lawyer John Badalamenti said Yates
did not receive fair notice that his actions
would be covered by the provision.
Prosecutors in Florida accused Yates of
illegally destroying the evidence showing
that he had harvested red grouper fish that
were smaller than the minimum 20 inches in
length required under federal regulations.
Yates, who lives in Holmes Beach, 32 miles
south of Tampa, has not been able get work
as a fisherman following his trial,
Badalamenti said.

"He doesn't want this to happen to anyone
else."
Asked if Yates, 62, would be courting media
attention like Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy,
who last week battled federal agents over
the cost of grazing rights on public land,
Badalamenti demurred.
"I don't think you are going to see him as a
poster-child for any particular political
persuasion," the lawyer said.
The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers said in a friend-of-thecourt brief that the use of the SarbanesOxley law in Yates's case was an example of
an
increasing
"over-criminalization
epidemic" in which federal prosecutions
punish conduct that could be handled with
civil penalties or under state law. The
association's brief noted that Yates was not
charged with any violation of fishing laws.
Yates has been backed also by Cause of
Action, a conservative-leaning group critical
of expansive criminal laws.
Even if Yates wins his case before the high
court, his conviction for one count of
preventing the government from taking
custody of the fish will remain intact.
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Oral arguments and a decision are expected
in the court's next term, which begins in
October and ends in June 2015.
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, the
government's lawyer before the Supreme
Court, said in court papers that Yates was
not disputing that he "directed the
destruction or concealment of the fish" and
that he had "obstructive intent." He wrote
that a fish is a "tangible object" based on the
"ordinary and natural meaning" of the
phrase.
The case began in August 2007 when
federal and state officials measured fish on
Yates's boat that they suspected were
undersized. At that time, 72 were found to
be under 20 inches, with some as short as 18
to 19 inches. After the boat returned to port,
agents re-measured the fish. Only 69 were
undersized, and they were all closer to the
20-inch mark.

A crew member later testified at trial that
Yates had told crew members to throw the
undersized fish overboard and replace them
with others. In August 2013, the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction, finding in part that a fish fit
within the definition of a "tangible object."
The U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee has both Republican and
Democratic members studying concerns
about federal laws being applied too
broadly. It has heard testimony about cases
including the prosecution of Lawrence
Lewis, a janitor at a Washington, D.C.,
retirement home who was convicted of
violating the Clean Water Act following a
sewage backup.
The case is United States v. Yates, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 13-7451.

490

“Fishy Application of Sarbanes-Oxley's Ban on Evidence Destruction”
FindLaw
William Peacock
July 11, 2014
One fish, two fish, red fish, short fish?

What Is a 'Tangible Object'?

John L. Yates is a commercial fisherman. In
2007, he was hauling in some red grouper
when a fisheries officer boarded his ship to
inspect his haul. After measuring the fish
and finding that some of them were less than
the minimum size of 20 inches, he issued
Yates a citation and set aside the short fish
for inspection at the docks.

Section 1519 punishes those who knowingly
destroy or conceal "any record, document,
or tangible object" in order to impede an
investigation. And a fish, when it is
evidence in a federal fisheries investigation,
would seem to fit under the generic meaning
of "tangible object." That's what the
Eleventh Circuit held, anyway.

Yates had his crew toss the short fish
overboard and replace them with other fish.
He was later convicted for violating an
evidence destruction provision of the the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act banking reform statute,
passed in the wake of the Enron scandal.
He's appealing that conviction to the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing that the vague
statute has no place in the Gulf of Mexico.

Yates has appealed to the Supreme Court,
asking whether the vague statute, which
does not define "tangible object," could
reasonably apply to an object that has "no
record-keeping,
documentary,
or
informational content or purpose." The
Court has already granted cert., so this is set
for next term's docket.

Fine Points of Fish Measurement
If you want to learn the fine points of fish
measurement, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion
is unintentionally hilarious. For example,
opening and closing a fish's mouth can
change its length by a few millimeters. And
putting fish on ice can lead to shrinkage.
The parties actually had experts lined up to
testify about size and technique of
measurement of Yate's red grouper.
The real issue, however, is the application of
a banking reform statute to a fisherman.

A number of amicus briefs have been filed
in the case in the last week, including an
interesting argument from the Cato Institute.
The Cato brief argues the context of the
statute should aid interpretation, and in this
case, "record, document or tangible object"
indicates that "tangible object" should be
limited to items related to records or
documents (hard drives, diskettes, etc.).
Otherwise, the overly broad dictionary
definition used by the Eleventh Circuit
would render "record" and "document"
superfluous.
That's certainly a good point: Statutes
should be constructed so that no term is
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superfluous. (This is the Rule Against
Surplusage
principle
of
statutory
construction.) The Eleventh Circuit didn't
address that argument in its one-paragraph
approach to statutory interpretation, nor did
it address Yates' argument about the Rule of

Lenity, a canon which requires that statutes
give notice of what conduct is illegal -would a reasonable person expect a banking
statute to be applied to flinging fish in the
sea.
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“Fish Not Tangibles Under SOX, Defense Groups Tell Justices”
Law360
Carolina Bolado
July 11, 2014
A criminal defense attorney association and
a number of criminal defense law professors
have urged the U.S. Supreme Court to toss a
Florida commercial fisherman's records
destruction conviction for dumping three
undersized red grouper, calling the
conviction “overcriminalization through an
unconstitutional expansion of the SarbanesOxley
Act."
The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, the American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers and a group of
18 criminal law professors filed amicus
briefs on July 7 supporting John L. Yates,
who was found guilty of the so-called antishredding provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which was passed in the wake of the
Enron scandal in 2002. The law criminalizes
the destruction of records, be they
documents or tangible objects — which the
Eleventh Circuit said includes fish.
In its brief, the NACDL decried
overcriminalization and said that Yates
could not have been found guilty under
federal law, because the application of the
anti-shredding statute to “three rotten fish”
is an unconstitutional expansion of the law.
The law professors agreed, saying no one
would reasonably expect the SarbanesOxley Act to apply to a fisherman throwing
red grouper into the Gulf of Mexico.
“In

context,

the

phrase

'any

record,

document or tangible object' no more
applies to fish than the phrase 'an
automobile, automobile truck, automobile
wagon, motorcycle or any other selfpropelled vehicle' applies to airplanes,” the
professors
said.
They added that if the term “tangible object”
in the statute includes fish, then the law
“captures essentially every physical item
within the jurisdictional reach of the United
States.”
The nation's highest court agreed in April to
hear the appeal. The justices will have to
consider whether the law can cover anything
meeting the dictionary definition of the term
“tangible object,” even when there is no
connection
to
corporate
records.
Yates argues that any interpretation of the
law should take into account the nouns
accompanying the pivotal phrase, noting that
fish possess no documentary purpose.
The saga dates back to a summer 2007
fishing trip on Yates' boat, the "Miss Katie."
A Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission officer spotted the vessel and
inspected the fish that Yates and his crew
had
hauled
in.
The officer determined that 72 grouper met
the federal minimum of 20 inches, but found
three that were smaller and issued Yates a
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citation. Although Yates was told to bring
the fish back to port undisturbed for the
Fisheries Service to seize, he instead told his
crew to toss them overboard and replaced
them with legally sized grouper, according
to
court
documents.
A federal jury found Yates guilty of
disposing undersized fish and of violating
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's record-destruction
provision, sentencing him to 30 days'
imprisonment. The Eleventh Circuit upheld
the ruling in August, finding that the phrase
“tangible
object”
applies
to
fish.
The law professors are represented by
Steffen N. Johnson, Andrew C. Nichols,
Eric M. Goldstein and Eric T. Werlinger of
Winston
&
Strawn
LLP.

Petrochemical
Manufacturers
are
represented by William N. Shepherd of
Holland & Knight LLP and NACDL
attorney
Barbara
E.
Bergman.
Yates is represented by Assistant Federal
Public Defender John L. Badalamenti and
Federal Public Defender Donna Lee Elm of
the Office of the Federal Public Defender
for the Middle District of Florida.
The federal government is represented by
U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.;
and Acting Assistant Attorney General
Mythili Raman and attorney John F. DePue
of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The case is Yates v. U.S., case number 137451, in the Supreme Court of the United
States.

The NACDL and the American Fuel &
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“Commercial Fisherman's Conviction for Disposing of His Catch of
Undersized Grouper Upheld”
The Swartz Law Firm
August 24, 2013
In U.S. v. Yates the defendant and his crew
were on a commercial fishing trip into the
Gulf of Mexico when he was stopped by a
federally deputized Florida Fish and
Wildlife officer on patrol for fishery
violations and compliance. After boarding
the defendant's boat, he noticed red grouper
that appeared to be less than the 20-inch
minimum size limit. He measured them with
mouths closed and determined there were 72
grouper that clearly measured less than 20
inches. He separated the undersized one into
crates, issued a citation, and instructed the
defendant not to disturb the crates. He told
him that the National Marine Fisheries
Service would seize them upon the vessel's
return to port. Instead of following the
instructions, the captain had his crew throw
the undersized fish overboard and replaced
them with other larger grouper. When the
vessel returned to port in Florida and the
officer measured the fish, he suspected they
were not the same fish he previously
measured. The switch was discovered after a
crewmember was interviewed. The captain
was charged and convicted of knowingly
disposing of undersized fish in order to
prevent the government from taking custody
and control in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§2232(a), and was convicted of destroying a
"tangible object with the intent to impede
obstruct or influence the government's
investigation into harvesting undersized
grouper" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519.
Insufficient evidence argument rejected.

The defendant argued on appeal there was
insufficient evidence that the fish thrown
overboard were undersized because the
officer failed to measure the grouper with
mouths open and instead measured them
with mouths closed. He argued there is
speculation as to whether the fish would
have been undersized if measured with
mouths opened. The court rejected this
argument finding that there was conflicting
testimony as to whether this would have
made any difference, and the jury was free
to weigh and decide the issue. Furthermore,
the defendant's directing the crew to throw
fish overboard together with his admission
that he had at least a few undersized fish on
his boat when the officer first measured
them, was evidence he believed the fish
were undersized.
Fish are tangible objects
The defendant argued that the term "tangible
object" as used in 18 U.S.C. §1519 only
apple to records, documents or items related
to record keeping and does not apply to fish.
The court decided that the statutory
construction of the term would be given its
plain meaning and concluded that tangible
objects includes fish.
Exclusion of expert on measuring fish was
not prejudicial
Finally, the defendant argued that he was
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling
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disallowing the defendant from calling an
expert in his case-in-chief to testify that
grouper measure three to four millimeters
longer with mouth open versus when mouth
closed. The defense failed to give notice to
the government pursuant to Rule
16(b)(1)(C) that it intended to call this

expert witness and the trial court's sanction
was not allowing the witness to testify. The
court of appeals declined to determine if the
district court exercise of its discretion was
proper because the defendant failed to show
any prejudice by the preclusion of this
testimony.
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NEW TOPIC: DEATH PENALTY PROTOCOLS
“Court Extends Curbs on the Death Penalty in a Florida Ruling”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 27, 2014
The Supreme Court on Tuesday continued a
trend to limit capital punishment, ruling that
Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff was too rigid to
decide which mentally disabled individuals
must be spared the death penalty.

“Death row inmates commonly suffer from
multidimensional mental problems,” Mr.
Freedman said. “Today’s ruling requires
courts to investigate these fully, by looking
at the elephant rather than the tail.”

“Florida seeks to execute a man because he
scored a 71 instead of a 70 on an I.Q. test,”
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the
majority in a 5-to-4 decision.

In Tuesday’s decision, Justice Kennedy said
that closer supervision of the states was
warranted given the nature of the
punishment. “The death penalty is the
gravest sentence our society may impose,”
he wrote. “Persons facing that most severe
sanction must have a fair opportunity to
show that the Constitution prohibits their
execution. Florida’s law contravenes our
nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty
to teach human decency as the mark of a
civilized world.”

Justice Kennedy was joined by the court’s
four-member liberal wing, a recurring
coalition in cases concerning harsh
punishments.
When the court barred the execution of
people with mental disabilities in 2002 in
Atkins v. Virginia, it largely let the states
determine who qualified. Tuesday’s
decision, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote
for the four dissenters, represented a “sea
change” in the court’s approach.
The ruling will affect not only Florida,
which has the nation’s second-largest death
row after California, but also as many as
eight other states by Justice Kennedy’s
count, including Alabama and Virginia.
They will now be required to take a less
mechanical approach to mental disability in
capital cases, said Eric M. Freedman, a law
professor at Hofstra.

The case, Hall v. Florida, arose from the
1978 murder of Karol Hurst, who was 21
and seven months pregnant when Freddie L.
Hall and an accomplice forced her into her
car in a supermarket parking lot. She was
found in a wooded area, where she had been
beaten, sexually assaulted and shot.
There was significant evidence in school and
court records of Mr. Hall’s intellectual
disability. Before the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Atkins case, a trial judge
found that there was “substantial evidence”
that Mr. Hall “has been mentally retarded
his entire life.”
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After the Atkins decision, Mr. Hall
challenged his death sentence, relying in
part on the earlier state court determinations.
The Atkins decision gave states only general
guidance. It said a finding of intellectual
disability required proof of three things:
“subaverage
intellectual
functioning,”
meaning low I.Q. scores; a lack of
fundamental social and practical skills; and
the presence of both conditions before age
18. The court said I.Q. scores under
“approximately 70” typically indicate
disability.
A Florida law enacted not long before the
Atkins decision created what Mr. Hall’s
lawyers called an “inflexible bright-line
cutoff” requiring proof of an I.Q. of 70 or
below.
In 2012, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that Mr. Hall was eligible to be executed
because his I.Q. had been measured at
various times as 71, 73, and 80.
That approach, Justice Kennedy wrote, had
at least two flaws. One was that it failed to
take account of standard errors of
measurement.
“An individual’s score is best understood as
a range of scores on either side of the
recorded score,” he wrote.
The second problem, he said, was that a
rigid cutoff excluders consideration of other
evidence. “Intellectual disability is a
condition, not a number,” he wrote.
Justice Alito protested that this changed the
rules announced in Atkins, which required
both low scores and more practical proof.

He was also sharply critical of the court’s
reliance on the views of medical experts,
saying the majority had overruled part of the
Atkins decision “based largely on the
positions adopted by private professional
organizations.”
The Supreme Court assesses whether given
practices are barred by the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment by considering, in the
words of a 1958 decision, “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”
In doing so, Justice Alito said, it had always
“meant the standards of American society as
a whole.”
“Now, however,” he wrote, “the court
strikes down a state law based on the
evolving standards of professional societies,
most notably the American Psychiatric
Association.”
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas joined the dissent.
The majority and dissenting opinions
clashed over statistics and over how many
states had laws similar to Florida’s. By
Justice Kennedy’s count, Kentucky and
Virginia have adopted a fixed cutoff of 70
by statute, and Alabama by court decision.
Five other states (Arizona, Delaware,
Kansas, North Carolina and Washington),
Justice Kennedy said, have laws open to the
same interpretation.
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan
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joined the majority opinion. In earlier
decisions limiting the use of the death
penalty and other harsh punishments under
the Eighth Amendment, Justice Kennedy has
often joined the court’s liberal wing. He
wrote several of those decisions, sometimes
using the soaring language that marked his
majority opinion on Tuesday.
“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of
dignity,” he wrote, “reflects the nation we
have been, the nation we are, and the nation
we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the
nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must
be to transmit the Constitution so that its
precepts and guarantees retain their meaning
and force.”

Justice Kennedy was also in the majority in
cases striking down the death penalty for the
mentally disabled, for juvenile offenders and
for non-homicide crime and in ones limiting
the use of life without parole sentences for
juvenile offenders.
The court returned Mr. Hall’s case to the
lower courts for a fresh assessment of his
condition. “Freddie Lee Hall may or may
not be intellectually disabled,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “but the law requires that he
have the opportunity to present evidence of
his intellectual disability, including deficits
in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.”
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“Arizona Execution Will Move Forward After Last-Minute Appeals”
Time
Josh Sanburn
July 23, 2014
A rare victory for a death row inmate over
the weekend was quashed Tuesday when the
Supreme Court lifted a stay of execution for
Joseph Wood, who was sentenced to death
for the murder of his girlfriend and her
father in 1989.
In a three-sentence order, the Supreme Court
reversed a judgment by the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals that halted Wood’s
execution based on the secrecy surrounding
where the state obtains the drugs to carry out
lethal injection. About a half-hour after
Wood was scheduled to be executed,
Arizona’s top court announced that it had
temporarily halted the execution on appeals.
Wood’s lawyers said he did not have proper
legal representation. They also claimed that
Arizona’s “experimental” lethal injection
methods, which include drugs like
midazolam
that
have
been
used
in executions that have gone awry in other
states,
would
violate
the
Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. But that stay was lifted
Wednesday afternoon after the court heard
last-minute appeals from Wood’s lawyers,
clearing the way for Wood to be executed by
lethal injection.
Death row inmates around the U.S. have
challenged the constitutionality of their
lethal injections, often arguing that the laws
and policies shielding drug manufacturers’
identities are unconstitutional. Due to drug

shortages and boycotts by pharmaceutical
companies, many states in the last few years
have obtained lethal injection drugs from
compounding pharmacies, which are
unregulated by the federal government.
Courts around the country have been largely
unreceptive to those arguments. Wood’s
case, however, was an exception.
Wood’s lawyers asked the state to halt his
execution if it did not provide the origins of
the drugs as well as the qualifications of the
executioners, relying not on an Eighth
Amendment argument regarding the risk of
cruel and unusual punishment, but rather a
First Amendment defense that Wood had a
right to access information about his
execution. A U.S. District Court judge in
Phoenix initially denied the request, but the
Ninth Circuit sided with Wood.
The court denied appeals by the state to lift
the stay, sending the case to the Supreme
Court, which has been reluctant to step into
the ongoing battle over lethal injection.
But while the fate of lethal injection in the
U.S. remains uncertain, reverting to an older
method of executions got an unexpected
endorsement. In a separate opinion by the
Ninth Circuit that upheld Wood’s stay of
execution before the Supreme Court
intervened, Judge Alex Kozinski called
lethal injection flawed and proposed
bringing back the firing squad.
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“If some states and the federal government
wish to continue carrying out the death
penalty, they must turn away from this
misguided path and return to more
primitive—and foolproof—methods of
execution,” Judge Kozinski wrote. “The
guillotine is probably best but seems
inconsistent with our national ethos. And the
electric chair, hanging and the gas chamber
are each subject to occasional mishaps. The
firing squad strikes me as the most
promising. Eight or ten large-caliber bullets
fired at close range can inflict massive
damage, causing instant death every time. …

Sure, firing squads can be messy, but if we
are willing to carry out executions, we
should not shield ourselves from the reality
that we are shedding human blood.”
Legislators in several states have
proposed bringing back firing squads. Only
Oklahoma and Utah currently allow them,
according to the Death Penalty Information
Center, but only under very limited
circumstances.
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“Arizona Killer Takes Two Hours to Die, Fueling Lethal Injection Debate”
LA Times
Matt Pearce, Cindy Carcamo, & Maya Srikrishnan
July 23, 2014
A convicted murderer in Arizona gasped and
snorted for more than 90 minutes after a
lethal injection Wednesday, his attorneys
and witnesses said, dying in a botched
execution that prompted the governor to
order an investigation and the state Supreme
Court to mandate that the materials used in
the procedure be preserved.
Joseph Rudolph Wood III's execution almost
certainly will reinvigorate the national
debate over the death penalty. He received
an injection at 1:52 p.m. at the Arizona State
Prison Complex in Florence. The execution
became so prolonged that reporters
witnessing the execution counted several
hundred of his wheezes before he was
finally declared dead at 3:49 p.m. — nearly
two hours after the procedure began.
The incident comes in a year in which lethal
injections had already triggered controversy
over botched procedures and secrecy.
Wood had fought without success to get
more information about the drugs and the
expertise of his executioners. His request,
which was rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court, prompted one prominent appellate
judge to call for the return of the firing
squad.
The Arizona Supreme Court ordered
officials to preserve the remaining drugs
used in his execution and the drug labels.

Gov. Jan Brewer ordered the state
Department of Corrections to conduct a full
review, saying she was “concerned” about
the length of time it took Wood to die.
“One thing is certain, however, inmate
Wood died in a lawful manner, and by
eyewitness and medical accounts he did not
suffer,” Brewer said in a statement. “This is
in stark comparison to the gruesome, vicious
suffering that he inflicted on his two victims
— and the lifetime of suffering he has
caused their family.”
Wood, 55, was sentenced to death in 1991
for the August 1989 shooting deaths of his
estranged girlfriend, Debra Dietz, and her
father, Eugene Dietz, in Tucson.
Wood's last words were to his victims'
family, according to an Associated Press
reporter who witnessed the execution: “I
take comfort knowing today my pain stops,
and I said a prayer that on this or any other
day you may find peace in all of your hearts
and may God forgive you all.”
It took so long for Wood to die after
receiving an injection of midazolam
combined with hydromorphone that his
attorneys filed emergency appeals to save
his life.
“At 1:57 p.m [officials] reported that Mr.
Wood was sedated, but at 2:02 he began to
breathe,” said the legal filing in federal court
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from public defender Jon M. Sands. “At
2:03 his mouth moved. Mr. Wood has
continued to breathe since that time. He has
been gasping and snorting for more than an
hour. At 3:02 p.m. ... staff rechecked for
sedation. He is still alive.”
A Wood attorney also went to the state
Supreme Court, which was conducting a
hearing by telephone when he was
pronounced dead.
The question of whether he suffered divided
those who watched the procedure.
Another attorney for Wood, Dale A. Baich,
was among them. He said that during the 1
hour and 40 minutes Wood was gasping and
snorting, he could not tell whether he was
conscious. “There was no sound in the
witness room, so we could not hear,” he
said.
A spokeswoman for the Arizona attorney
general's office who was also a witness
disputed that. “There was no gasping of air.
There was snoring,” Stephanie Grisham
said. “He just laid there. It was quite
peaceful.”
Baich responded: “My observation was that
he was gasping and struggling to breathe. I
couldn't tell if he was snoring. Even if he
was snoring, it took two hours for him to
die?”
Baich
called
investigation.

for

an

independent

Wood's prolonged death drew an outcry
from capital punishment opponents.

“It's time for Arizona and the other states
still using lethal injection to admit that this
experiment with unreliable drugs is a
failure,” Cassandra Stubbs, director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's Capital
Punishment Project, said in a statement.
“Instead of hiding lethal injection under
layers of foolish secrecy, these states need to
show us where the drugs are [coming] from.
Until they can give assurances that the drugs
will work as intended, they must stop future
executions.”
Megan McCracken of the Death Penalty
Clinic at UC Berkeley School of Law
concurred: “We see that when the state is
allowed to carry out an execution with an
experimental drug combination without
scrutiny and oversight, the consequences are
absolutely horrific.”
Wood's execution revived memories of
those in Ohio and Oklahoma this year.
Ohio used the same drug combination to
execute Dennis McGuire in January.
Witnesses said that “McGuire started
struggling and gasping loudly for air,
making snorting and choking sounds which
lasted for at least 10 minutes, with his chest
heaving and his fist clenched.” Ohio
executions are on hold while a federal court
reviews the state's execution protocol.
Then, in April, Oklahoma murderer Clayton
Lockett died of a heart attack 43 minutes
after his execution began — and after the
state had called off his execution as he
writhed and gasped. Details about the lethal
drugs and those who administer them are
kept secret in many states. Wood had
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launched a 1st Amendment attack on that
veil of secrecy, arguing that the public has a
right to know more about the state's gravest
responsibility.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, halting his execution with a
preliminary injunction Saturday. The U.S.
Supreme Court lifted the injunction
Tuesday. Arizona's state Supreme Court also
allowed the execution to go ahead.
The chief judge of the 9th Circuit, Alex
Kozinski, had supported Wood's execution
but suggested that lethal drugs should be
replaced
with
something
more
efficient, such as firing squads.

The latest botched execution could force the
U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the issue.
Six years ago, the court rejected a “cruel and
unusual punishment” challenge to lethal
injections in a Kentucky case but left the
door open for future challenges.
Among the witnesses were the victims'
family.
“This man conducted a horrific murder, and
you guys are going, ‘Let's worry about the
drugs,'” Richard Brown, Debra Dietz's
brother-in-law, told reporters. “Why didn't
they give him a bullet, why didn't we give
him Drano?”
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“One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next”
New York Times
Erik Eckholm
April 29, 2014
What was supposed to be the first of two
executions here on Tuesday night was halted
when prisoner, Clayton D. Lockett, began to
writhe and gasp after he had already been
declared unconscious and called out “oh,
man,” according to witnesses.
The administering doctor intervened and
discovered that “the line had blown,” said
the director of corrections, Robert Patton,
meaning that drugs were no longer flowing
into Mr. Lockett’s vein.
At 7:06 p.m., Mr. Patton said, Mr. Lockett
died in the execution chamber, of a heart
attack.
Mr. Patton said the governor had agreed to
his request for a stay of 14 days in the
second execution scheduled for Tuesday
night, that of Charles F. Warner.
It was a chaotic and disastrous step in
Oklahoma’s long effort to execute the two
men, overcoming their objections that the
state would not disclose the source of the
drugs being used in a newly tried
combination.
According to Mr. Patton, it was the method
of administration, not the drugs themselves,
that failed, but it resulted in what witnesses
called an agonizing scene.
“This was botched, and it was difficult to
watch,” said David Autry, one of Mr.
Lockett’s lawyers.

Dean Sanderford, another lawyer for Mr.
Lockett, said, “It looked like torture.”
A medical technical inserted the IV needle
and then the first drug, a sedative intended
to knock the man out and forestall pain, was
administered at 6:23 p.m. Ten minutes later,
the doctor announced that Mr. Lockett was
unconscious, and the team started to
administer the next two drugs, a paralytic
and one intended to make the heart stop.
At that point, witnesses said, things began to
go awry. Mr. Lockett’s body twitched, his
foot shook and he mumbled, witnesses said.
At 6:37 p.m., he tried to rise and exhaled
loudly. At that point, prison officials pulled
a curtain in front of the witnesses and the
doctor discovered a “vein failure,” Mr.
Patton said.
Without effective sedation, the second two
drugs are known to cause agonizing
suffocation and pain.
Mr. Lockett’s apparent revival and writhing
raised questions about the doctor’s initial
declaration that he was unconscious and are
sure to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the
sedative used.
Gov. Mary Fallin said late Tuesday, “I have
asked the Department of Corrections to
conduct a full review of Oklahoma’s
execution procedures to determine what
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happened and why during this evening’s
execution of Clayton Derrell Lockett.”
Madeline Cohen, a federal public defender
and lawyer for Mr. Warner, said that while
prison officials asserted that the problem
was only with the intravenous line, “unless
we have a full and independent
investigation, we’ll never know.”
“No execution should take place in
Oklahoma until there has been a full
investigation into Clayton Lockett’s death,
including an independent autopsy and full
transparency surrounding the drugs and the
process of administering them,” she said.
The appeals for disclosure about the drug
sources, supported by a state court in March,
threw Oklahoma’s highest courts and
elected officials into weeks of conflict and
disarray, with courts arguing over which
should consider the request for a politically
unpopular stay of execution, the governor
defying the State Supreme Court’s ruling for
a delay, and a legislator seeking
impeachment of the justices.
The planned executions of Mr. Lockett, 38,
and Mr. Warner, 46, dramatized the growing
tension nationally over secrecy in lethal
injections as drug companies, saying they
are fearful of political and even physical
attack, refuse to supply drugs, and many
states scramble to find new sources and try
untested combinations. Several states have
imposed secrecy on the suppliers of lethal
injection drugs, leading to court battles over
due process and the ban on cruel and usual
punishment.

Lawyers for the two convicts said the lack of
supplier information made it impossible to
know if the drugs were safe and effective, or
might possibly violate the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
Officials swore that the drugs had been
obtained legally from licensed pharmacies
and had not expired. Ms. Fallin, expressing
the view of many here, said earlier Tuesday,
“Two men that do not contest their guilt in
heinous murders will now face justice.”
But that sentiment was overshadowed by
Tuesday night’s bungled execution, which is
certain to generate more challenges to lethal
injection, long considered the most human
of execution methods.
Mr. Lockett was convicted of shooting a 19year-old woman in 1999 and burying her
alive. Mr. Warner, condemned for the rape
and murder of an 11-month-old girl in 1997,
was to be executed two hours later.
The two men spent Tuesday in adjacent
cells, visited by their lawyers and, in Mr.
Warner’s case, family members.
The
hulking white penitentiary in this small town
in southeast Oklahoma, amid prairies now
green from soaking spring rains, is the
prison from which Tom Joad is paroled in
the opening pages of John Steinbeck’s “The
Grapes of Wrath.”
In keeping with the untried drug protocol
announced by the Corrections Department
this month, Mr. Lockett was first injected
with midazolam, a benzodiazepine intended
to render the prisoner unconscious. This
was to be followed by injections of
vecuronium bromide, a paralyzing agent that
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stops breathing, and then
chloride, which stops the heart.

potassium

This combination has been used in Florida,
but with a much higher dose of midazolam
than Oklahoma used.
Faced with shortages, Oklahoma and other
states have turned to compounding
pharmacies – lightly regulated laboratories
that mix up drugs to order. Opponents have
raised questions about quality control,
especially after the widely reported dying
gasps of a convict in Ohio for more than 10
minutes, and an Oklahoma inmate’s
utterance, “I feel my whole body burning,”
after being injected with compounded drugs.
Oklahoma later said it had found a federally
approved manufacturer to provide the drugs
for Tuesday’s executions, but refused to
identify it.
Oklahoma’s attorney general, Scott Pruitt,
derided the lawsuits over drug secrecy,
calling them delaying tactics. Many legal
experts, especially death penalty opponents,
say otherwise.
“Information on the drug that is intended to
act as the anesthetic is crucial to ensure that
the execution will be humane,” said Jennifer
Moreno, a lawyer with the Berkeley Law
School’s Death Penalty Clinic.
Elsewhere, Texas has refused to reveal
where it obtained a new batch of
compounded drugs; a challenge before the
State Supreme Court. Georgia passed a law
last year making information about lethal
drug suppliers a “confidential state secret”; a
challenge is also pending in that state’s top
court.

This month, the United States Supreme
Court declined to hear suits attacking drug
secrecy in Missouri and Louisiana.
But three of the justices expressed interest,
and the issue seems likely to be considered
by the Supreme Court at some point, said
Eric M. Freedman, a professor of
constitutional law at Hofstra University.
In March, it appeared that Mr. Lockett and
Mr. Warner had won the right to know more
about the drugs when an Oklahoma judge
ruled that the secrecy law was
unconstitutional. But the judge said she did
not have the authority to grant the men stays
of execution, sending the inmates into a
Kafkaesque legal maze.
The state’s Court of Criminal Appeals
repeatedly turned back the Supreme Court’s
order to rule on a stay, while the attorney
general insisted that the executions would go
ahead.
On April 21, the Supreme Court said that to
avoid a miscarriage of justice, it would delay
the executions until it had time to resolve the
secrecy matter.
The next day, Ms. Fallin, a Republican, said
the Supreme Court had overstepped its
powers, and she directed officials to carry
out both executions on April 29. An
outraged legislator, Representative Mike
Christian, said he would seek to impeach the
justices, who were already under fire from
conservative legislators for striking down
laws the court deemed unconstitutional.
A constitutional crisis appeared to be
brewing. But last Wednesday, the Supreme
Court announced a decision on the secrecy
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issue – overturning the lower court and

declaring that the executions could proceed.
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“Gambling With Death: Is the Supreme Court Poised to Abolish the Death
Penalty?”
Slate
Evan Mandery
July 24, 2014
Abolitionists have ample reason to believe a
Supreme Court decision declaring the death
penalty unconstitutional is within their
grasp. After another botched execution this
week, it must look like the day is coming
ever closer.
Over the past dozen years, the court has
gradually narrowed the permissible uses of
capital punishment, rejecting its use for
juveniles, child rapists who did not kill, and
the mentally retarded. This past May,
in Hall v. Florida, the court also announced
that mental retardation couldn’t be
determined by a hard and fast numeric rule,
which Florida and other states had used to
limit the impact of the court’s ban.
Those decisions suggest to court watchers
that there may finally be a five-justice
majority to reject the death penalty in all
cases. The questions folks are asking are
who are they and when will it happen. The
liberal wing seems dependable. Justices
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
have both consistently voted against the
death penalty. Last year, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor dissented from the court’s
refusal to hear a challenge to Alabama’s
death penalty law, which allows a judge to
override a jury’s recommendation of mercy.
Based on Justice Elena Kagan’s vote
in Hall and her legal pedigree—which
includes a stint clerking for Thurgood

Marshall, an outspoken death penalty
opponent—there’s ample reason to believe
she’d be receptive to a constitutional
challenge to capital punishment as well.
There’s also ample reason to believe that a
fifth vote could come from Justice Anthony
Kennedy. In fact, one could argue that
Kennedy’s vote is even more dependable
than the others. The juvenile case (Roper v.
Simmons), the child rapist case (Kennedy v.
Louisiana), and Hall, were all 5–4 decisions.
In each, Kennedy both cast the decisive vote
and wrote the majority opinion. Over the
years, his position on capital punishment has
become more principled and his rhetoric
increasingly robust. In Hall, Kennedy wrote
that executing an intellectually disabled
individual “violates his or her inherent
dignity as a human being” and serves “no
legitimate penological purpose.” He has also
repeatedly
expressed
concern
with
America’s international position as a grim
outlier on the death penalty and, as far back
as a 2003 speech to the American Bar
Association, has said that he is deeply
troubled by the American criminal justice
system generally.
And suddenly this week, two broad-based
challenges to capital punishment have been
hand-delivered
to
death
penalty
abolitionists. If the court is standing by, it
should be on notice that the situation on the
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ground is changing. Judge Cormac Carney’s
decision last week rejecting the California
death penalty as unconstitutionally arbitrary
is remarkable. It is also a template for a
Supreme Court brief seeking to abolish the
death penalty nationwide. Furman v.
Georgia, a 1972 decision striking down the
death penalty as then practiced as
unconstitutional, and Gregg v. Georgia, a
1976 decision upholding revised death
penalty laws, require states to create
nonarbitrary sentencing systems. Carney’s
conclusion last week is that this mandate is
violated by his state’s practice of executing
only a random few murderers. California
executes a smaller percentage of deathsentenced murderers than any other capital
punishment state, but the randomness
argument could be made about any other
death penalty state. Capital sentencing
everywhere is infected by racism and
classism.
The second sign that things could be
changing is Joseph Wood’s botched
execution Wednesday night. It, too, lays the
foundation for a compelling potential
argument for doing away with capital
punishment. In 2008, the court rejected by
7–2 a challenge to Kentucky’s lethal
injection protocol. The plurality opinion,
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts and
joined by Kennedy, held that “an isolated
mishap alone does not violate the Eighth
Amendment,” but after Wood this week,
and Clayton Lockett’s botched execution in
April, it’s difficult to characterize these
mishaps as isolated. They are starting to
look more like the norm.

Abolitionists have other reasons to believe
the lethal injection decision might be
reversed or modified. Breyer’s vote with the
majority in that 2008 case was tepid and
based in part of the insufficiency of the
evidence of suffering. Also, Kagan has
replaced John Paul Stevens, who voted with
the majority to uphold Kentucky’s lethal
injection system.
So is the court poised with five votes to end
capital punishment? Of course, Kennedy’s
vote is hardly a sure thing. Wood’s lawyers
asked Kennedy to stay the execution
midway through the two-hour procedure.
Kennedy refused. He also cast a decisive
fifth vote in a 2005 case upholding Kansas’
death penalty law, which says that when a
jury finds the aggravating and mitigating
evidence against a defendant to be equal, the
tie should go to death. Michael Meltsner,
who was the first associate counsel of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund during its
litigation campaign in the 1960s and ’70s
says, “I don’t think Kennedy is there yet.”
One might worry, too, about Kagan, who
said she accepted the constitutionality of
capital punishment during her confirmation
hearings.
It’s possible that the prospects for
overturning the death penalty might get
stronger if a Democrat wins the 2016
election and has the opportunity to replace
Kennedy or one or more of the conservative
justices with a more reliable vote for
abolition. But perhaps a Democrat will not
win, and perhaps Kennedy, who is 78, will
retire and be replaced by a far more strident
conservative in the mold of Justices Samuel
Alito or Antonin Scalia. Kennedy’s bona
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fides as a critic of the death penalty and the
American criminal justice system are
substantial. For the foreseeable future, this is
probably the best opportunity abolitionists
have to end the death penalty in America.
If, as some suspect, the five votes are indeed
there, the failure to press a case to the court
means the death penalty could linger long
beyond its natural life. If the votes aren’t
there, on the other hand, pressing a case to
the court could do great harm. It’s a massive
gamble. The justices might say that the
arbitrariness problem has been fixed and
give the American public further confidence
in capital punishment. If that happened, it’s
hard to imagine the court returning to the
issue anytime soon. One gets a crack at
these issues only every 50–100 years.
Carol Steiker, the Henry J. Friendly
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School,
says this of the abolition gamble:
It’s a tough call. On the one hand,
there’s been a stunning sea change in
the use of the death penalty, including
abolitions at the state level, declines in
both execution and death sentencing
rates, decline in public support, and
powerful international pressure against
the practice. Add to that the
geographical isolation of the death
penalty, which is used robustly in only a
few states and only a few counties
within those states, and it’s easy to see
capital punishment as a practice that the
court might deem to be marginalized
and withering. On the other hand, the
raw numbers aren’t as strong as they
were in any of the cases in which the
Supreme Court has ruled particular
death penalty practices unconstitutional.
If you bring a global challenge and lose,

it may make it harder to succeed in the
future. If you take a shot at the king,
you better kill him.
So, it’s a roll of the dice, and the stakes
could hardly be higher, but notably, no one’s
stepping up to roll those dice. In the 1960s,
Meltsner, Tony Amsterdam, and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund were in clear
control of the death penalty abolition
campaign. For better or worse, they
determined which issues should be brought
before the court and in which order. It’s
impossible to imagine Furman having been
won without their efforts. But today, there’s
no organized abolition program and no
Amsterdam or Meltsner. The gay marriage
movement has Ted Olson and David Boies.
The abolition campaign has no such
leadership. That’s not to say no one is
advocating against the death penalty or
representing the interests of people on death
row. They are. But no one is systematically
leading the thinking about how to influence
the Supreme Court through a series of
challenges and cases. As Meltsner says,
“The issues are far from as clear cut as they
were in the 1960s,” and points to the
influence of discrimination as an organizing
principle. “It was easy for us in a way,” he
said. “We began with race. We never left
race in a way. No matter how awful the
criminals were, randomness was worse
because it was based on race.”
Whatever brought them and bound them to
the cause, one can’t help but wish for a new
Meltsner or Amsterdam to emerge. There
may very well be a historic opportunity at
hand. It’d be a shame if it slipped by solely
for
a
lack
of
leadership.
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“Can the Death Penalty Survive Lethal Injection?”
U.S. News & World Report
Tierney Sneed
August 7, 2014
Missouri’s
execution
of
Michael
Worthington, who was convicted of raping
and murdering his neighbor, went as
planned early Wednesday morning. Appeals
for clemency to Democratic Gov. Jay Nixon
and for a stay to the U.S. Supreme Court
were denied, despite recent concerns
expressed about botched executions.
Worthington's punishment comes after the
last U.S. inmate to be executed, Joseph
Rudolph Wood III in Arizona, snored and by
some accounts gasped loudly throughout the
two-hour procedure, which his lawyers had
contested over the effectiveness and source
of the drugs being used to kill him. After a
similarly alarming April execution in
Oklahoma, President Barack Obama – who
supports capital punishment – instructed the
Department of Justice to review death
penalty protocols, meaning that despite the
relative success of lethal injection in
Worthington’s execution, questions about its
viability – particularly challenges in
obtaining and administering the drugs –
aren’t likely to go away.
Missouri executed Michael Worthington
early Wednesday morning for raping and
killing a female neighbor in 1995.
While people on both sides of the death
penalty issue agree there are problems with
lethal injection procedures that need to be
addressed – including a pro-death penalty
appellate judge on the 9th U.S. Circuit who

said ahead of the Arizona execution it was
time to go back to the firing squad – exactly
what should be done is an open question.
Death penalty opponents say lethal
injection's problems are just another reason
capital punishment should be abolished
altogether. Proponents, meanwhile, accuse
abolitionists of using issues with the specific
method to undermine the entire enterprise,
which, according to the Pew Research
Center, most Americans still support.
Within this quagmire, death penalty experts
fear there is a lack of political will to
address the increasingly apparent trouble
lethal injection is presenting state
executioners.
“It’s a mistake to conflate the criticisms with
lethal injection with the death penalty
itself,” says Deborah Denno, a Fordham
University law school professor who has
been studying lethal injection protocols for
more than two decades. “Conflating the two
has always been a problem on both sides.”
There have been issues with lethal injection
since it first came into use in 1982.
According to Amherst College’s Austin
Sarat – author of the book “Gruesome
Spectacles: Botched Executions and
America's Death Penalty,” which surveyed
every U.S. execution from 1890 to 2010 –
about 3 percent of all executions were
botched in that period, while the error rate of
lethal injections surveyed was about 7
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percent. His study did not include the most
recent spate of troublesome procedures,
which this year included another Oklahoma
execution as well as one in Ohio.
Previously, "botched executions did not play
a significant role in the overall question
about whether we should retain capital
punishment," Sarat says. "The context in
which the botched executions are happening
[now] is very different and has given them
and will give them greater significance in
the
national
debate
about
capital
punishment."
The recent surge in botched executions is
believed to be fueled by a shortage of the
drugs traditionally used for lethal injection.
The last U.S. manufacturer of sodium
thiopental stopped making the drug after
planning to resume doing so in Italy and
facing pressure from government authorities
there. The European Union has restricted
companies from exporting death penalty
drugs to the U.S., and execution labs have
been forced to concoct their own mix of
drugs in-house or turn to local apothecaries
to compound pharmaceuticals. Facing
scrutiny over these new protocols, some
states have passed secrecy laws, which
authorities argue protect the identities of
local drugmakers from harassment by antideath penalty activists.
Attorneys defending death row inmates have
used the situation to appeal executions on a
variety of constitutional grounds, including
freedom of information, due process, and
cruel and unusual punishment. So far, such
arguments have gained only limited traction
in the courts. A three-judge panel's
temporary stay of Wood’s execution marked

the first appellate-level decision to side with
the First Amendment argument that the
inmate deserved more information from the
state about the drugs being used to kill him.
The Supreme Court overturned the stay, and
the high court overall has appeared to be
extremely reluctant to weigh in on the
practice, having heard a lethal injection case
only once, in 2008, when it ruled
Kentucky’s three-drug protocol was
constitutional.
“It was clear the Supreme Court decision
was a failed effort immediately,” Denno
says, calling the Kentucky ruling – which
came with seven separate opinions –
“unclear, ambiguous," and one "that doesn't
really stand for anything.”
Even death penalty proponents recognize the
arguments inmates’ attorneys are making
will only gain more teeth as botched
executions continue.
“The more and more ugly cases, it becomes
likely that courts are likely to intervene, but
what that intervention looks like is a
fascinating and uncertain question,” says
Douglas Berman, an Ohio State University
law school professor.
The cost and length of time it takes to
litigate death penalty appeals is one of the
reasons many states have turned away from
capital punishment altogether. While still
legal in 32 states, only a handful conduct
executions on a relatively regular basis. The
delays and randomness of the California
system – which has the largest death row in
the country but hasn’t executed anyone since
2006 – recently led a federal judge to
overturn
an
execution
sentence
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there, declaring it cruel and unusual
punishment. In the last decade, six states
have formally abolished the death penalty
(bringing the total to 18, plus the District of
Columbia), even though in some states –
like Connecticut – capital punishment still
had public support when lawmakers opted to
end it.
The states that continue to execute people –
including
Texas,
Pennsylvania
and
Tennessee, all of which have executions
scheduled in the coming months – appear
unwilling to let go of the practice, even as
further questions arise.
“Holding on to the death penalty and
holding to the regularity of executions,
having a source of drugs from your
confidential source without asking many
questions – or at least not having to answer
many questions – that’s what's keeping these
experimental, unpredictable, sometimes
botched executions going lately,” says
Richard Dieter, executive director of the
Death Penalty Information Center.
In the aftermath of Wood’s execution,
conservative Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, a
Republican, said there would be an internal
investigation of the execution’s length, but
insisted the procedure was carried out “in a
lawful manner” and that Wood “did not
suffer." Documents released last week
revealed that 15 doses of a drug cocktail
were injected before Wood died, according
to The New York Times, though authorities
continue to deny Wood felt any pain.
“States don’t want to admit their failures, so
they keep plodding along,” Dieter says.
Meanwhile, a group of news organizations is

suing the Missouri Department of
Corrections to reveal the sources of its lethal
injection drugs.
Bringing more transparency, some say,
could help states improve their lethal
injection methods. But even some death
penalty proponents suggest it might be time
to abandon lethal injection altogether.
“There is a way the states could avoid all of
these problems with lethal injection – that
would be to switch to some other method,”
says Michael Rushford, president of the procapital punishment Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation.
Historically, every time states have switched
to a new method of execution – like the
movement from electrocution to lethal
injection in the 1970s and 1980s – it's been
due to political and legal pressures resulting
from botched executions carried out by
another method.
“The hope [was] that lethal injection was the
final frontier, the final solution to the desire
of Americans to both having the death
penalty and also finding a method of
execution that was safe, reliable and
humane. The problems with lethal injection
go to the heart of this hope,” Sarat says.
“There is no new technology over the
horizon. It’s not like we can say, ‘Botched
executions: OK, we can’t get the drugs, the
people aren't well-trained, but we can do
something new.’”
Not only did 9th Circuit Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski suggest a return to the firing squad
or one of the other more consistent – albeit
messier – older methods, he argued, “If we,
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as a society, cannot stomach the splatter
from an execution carried out by firing
squad, then we shouldn’t be carrying out
executions at all.”

“At the heart of all of this is the reality that
the only faction that is passionate about
reform has one particular reform in mind,
and that would be abolition,” Berman says.

Kozinski has since denied that he was being
hyperbolic, an assumption made by some
that highlights how public perception is
another obstacle to finding an alternative to
lethal injection.

PBS’ Gwen Ifill raised just that line of
thought in a recent interview with Attorney
General Eric Holder, who in turn denied that
the Justice Department's review of recent
protocols and problems would undercut
capital punishment as a whole.

“It's the biggest irony that people’s
hypocrisy about lethal injection is one of the
issues that is making these executions
botched,” Denno says. “They want to have
the so-called medical procedure because
they can’t face the fact that they're killing
people and the punishment that is most
humane [firing squad] most resembles
something that is real.”

“Even though I am personally opposed to
the death penalty, as attorney general, I have
to enforce federal law,” he said.

Another method also has been put forward:
Rushford mentions nitrogen gas or carbon
monoxide as "outside the box" options. But
doubts remain whether such a change could
truly quiet concerns people have about
capital punishment.
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